TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of corporate governance in forecasting bankruptcy
T2 - Pre- and post-SOX enactment
AU - Chan, Chia Ying
AU - Chou, De Wai
AU - Lin, Jane Raung
AU - Liu, Feng Ying
N1 - Funding Information:
Chou acknowledges research and financial ( NSC 98-2410-H-155-034 MY2 ) support from Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan .
Funding Information:
Chan acknowledges research and financial (NSC 100-2410-H-155-015) support from Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the improved performance of bankruptcy prediction models after including corporate governance variables. The empirical results demonstrate better predictive power for financial bankruptcy than previous bankruptcy prediction models, particularly in the post-SOX period. Our theoretical argument emphasizes the urgent need for such improvements to the bankruptcy prediction model following the introduction of the SOX Act, with the empirical results providing intuitive economic meaning for all relevant market participants. Policymakers may consider enacting laws to include designs for corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, entrepreneurs may use this model to improve their own governance structures and compensation mechanisms to avoid financial bankruptcy, and investors may refer to it to ensure that 'losers' are excluded from their investment portfolios.
AB - This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the improved performance of bankruptcy prediction models after including corporate governance variables. The empirical results demonstrate better predictive power for financial bankruptcy than previous bankruptcy prediction models, particularly in the post-SOX period. Our theoretical argument emphasizes the urgent need for such improvements to the bankruptcy prediction model following the introduction of the SOX Act, with the empirical results providing intuitive economic meaning for all relevant market participants. Policymakers may consider enacting laws to include designs for corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, entrepreneurs may use this model to improve their own governance structures and compensation mechanisms to avoid financial bankruptcy, and investors may refer to it to ensure that 'losers' are excluded from their investment portfolios.
KW - Bankruptcy prediction model
KW - Corporate governance
KW - Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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U2 - 10.1016/j.najef.2015.10.008
DO - 10.1016/j.najef.2015.10.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84947346649
SN - 1062-9408
VL - 35
SP - 166
EP - 188
JO - North American Journal of Economics and Finance
JF - North American Journal of Economics and Finance
ER -