Institutional ownership and corporate investment performance

Scott Fung*, Shih Chuan Tsai

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

5 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in improving firm performance through the channel of corporate investment decisions. We find that the interaction effect between institutional ownership and capital expenditures is significantly related to firm performance. We examine this relationship for different types of institutional investors, and find that investment advisors are most effective monitors in improving firm performance through corporate investment. Moreover, we find that the monitoring role of institutional investors becomes more important when internal governance is weak. Institutional ownership and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms (including CEO incentive compensation and control, shareholder right provisions, and board of director monitoring) operate as substitutes, rather than complements, in improving capital expenditure decisions.

原文英語
頁(從 - 到)348-365
頁數18
期刊Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences
29
發行號4
DOIs
出版狀態已發佈 - 2012 十二月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 商業與國際管理
  • 公共行政
  • 行銷
  • 技術與創新管理

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