Information asymmetry and corporate investment decisions: A dynamic approach

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻文章

7 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper develops a dynamic model of the financing and operating decisions of firms in the presence of information asymmetry. When the value of growth opportunities is not fully recognized, securities are undervalued, thus influencing the financing and investment decisions. The agency-based underinvestment problem is re-examined under information asymmetry. For firms with greater growth opportunities, the investment distortion resulting from information asymmetry is especially significant. Information asymmetry also increases the expected bankruptcy cost. The cost of information asymmetry in terms of both the firm value and the information spread under the optimal capital structure could be substantial.

原文英語
頁(從 - 到)241-271
頁數31
期刊Financial Review
43
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態已發佈 - 2008 五月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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