The role of lending-relationship banks in the underwriting of seasoned equity offerings: Conflict of interest or certification?

Hsuan Chi Chen, De Wai Chou, Christine W. Lai, Yi Ting Yeh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act address a potential conflict of interest by banning commercial banks from the market for corporate securities underwriting. This restriction was officially rescinded in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. In turn, this development has piqued the interest of scholars and renewed the debate on the role that commercial banks play, as well as the consequences of this role in equity offerings, which may either result in conflict of interest or certification. In this study, we comprehensively examine whether conflict of interest or certification more accurately characterizes the underwriting of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by lending-relationship banks. Overall, the results suggest that the presence of lending-relationship banks lowers the gross spreads and underpricing of SEOs. Furthermore, our evidence shows that SEOs led by lending-relationship banks exhibit better long-run performance than other SEOs, which supports the certification hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-346
Number of pages20
JournalNorth American Journal of Economics and Finance
Volume28
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

Fingerprint

Certification
Seasoned equity offerings
Lending relationships
Conflict of interest
Underwriting
Commercial banks
Glass-Steagall Act
Corporate security
Modernization
Long-run performance
Equity offerings
Underpricing
Gross spread

Keywords

  • Certification
  • Conflict of interest
  • G21
  • G24
  • Lending-relationship
  • Seasoned equity offering

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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title = "The role of lending-relationship banks in the underwriting of seasoned equity offerings: Conflict of interest or certification?",
abstract = "Sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act address a potential conflict of interest by banning commercial banks from the market for corporate securities underwriting. This restriction was officially rescinded in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. In turn, this development has piqued the interest of scholars and renewed the debate on the role that commercial banks play, as well as the consequences of this role in equity offerings, which may either result in conflict of interest or certification. In this study, we comprehensively examine whether conflict of interest or certification more accurately characterizes the underwriting of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by lending-relationship banks. Overall, the results suggest that the presence of lending-relationship banks lowers the gross spreads and underpricing of SEOs. Furthermore, our evidence shows that SEOs led by lending-relationship banks exhibit better long-run performance than other SEOs, which supports the certification hypothesis.",
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AU - Lai, Christine W.

AU - Yeh, Yi Ting

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AB - Sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act address a potential conflict of interest by banning commercial banks from the market for corporate securities underwriting. This restriction was officially rescinded in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. In turn, this development has piqued the interest of scholars and renewed the debate on the role that commercial banks play, as well as the consequences of this role in equity offerings, which may either result in conflict of interest or certification. In this study, we comprehensively examine whether conflict of interest or certification more accurately characterizes the underwriting of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by lending-relationship banks. Overall, the results suggest that the presence of lending-relationship banks lowers the gross spreads and underpricing of SEOs. Furthermore, our evidence shows that SEOs led by lending-relationship banks exhibit better long-run performance than other SEOs, which supports the certification hypothesis.

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