The effect of overvaluation on investment and accruals: The role of information

Shing Yang Hu, Yueh Hsiang Lin, Christine W. Lai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines whether the effect of overvaluation on accrual and investment is weak in a good information environment using the naive manager hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. The results show that CEOs recognize overvaluation and reduce their shareholdings regardless of the extent of the information environment and the naive manager hypothesis is not supported. However, managers in a good information environment do not respond to overvaluation with accrual or investment, and more institutional investors help to reduce overvaluation-driven behaviors. Thus, the monitoring hypothesis is supported. These findings are free from causality concerns and robust for alternative measures of misvaluation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-201
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Empirical Finance
Volume38
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Sep 1

Fingerprint

Overvaluation
Accruals
Information environment
Managers
Monitoring
Institutional investors
Shareholding
Causality
Chief executive officer

Keywords

  • Accrual
  • Capital investment
  • Earnings management
  • Governance
  • Information
  • Misvaluation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The effect of overvaluation on investment and accruals : The role of information. / Hu, Shing Yang; Lin, Yueh Hsiang; Lai, Christine W.

In: Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 38, 01.09.2016, p. 181-201.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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