TY - JOUR
T1 - Implementation of a multi-agent carbon emission reduction strategy under the chinese dual governance system
T2 - An evolutionary game theoretical approach
AU - Wang, Wenke
AU - You, Xiaoqiong
AU - Liu, Kebei
AU - Wu, Yenchun Jim
AU - You, Daming
N1 - Funding Information:
Funding: This research was funded by the International Science and Technology Innovation Cooperation Project of Sichuan Province, grant number 20GJHZ0039, the Social Science Planning Project of Sichuan Province, grant number SC19B111, 2020 Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project of Chengdu, grant number YY0520200707, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, grant number 71974209, and the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan, under grant MOST 108-2511-H-003-034-MY2.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, MDPI AG. All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/11/2
Y1 - 2020/11/2
N2 - A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.
AB - A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.
KW - Carbon emission reduction
KW - Central-local dual governance
KW - Evolutionary game theory
KW - Multi-agent
KW - Numerical simulation
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U2 - 10.3390/ijerph17228463
DO - 10.3390/ijerph17228463
M3 - Article
C2 - 33207551
AN - SCOPUS:85096224488
SN - 1661-7827
VL - 17
SP - 1
EP - 21
JO - International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
JF - International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
IS - 22
M1 - 8463
ER -