網路投資專家監督角色之探究

Among the countries in the world, China ranks first in internet applications. Many financial media in China establish online platforms for investors (regarded as Gub in China). Investors can express their viewpoints via online investment platforms and exchange views with other investors. Hence, investors acquire information not only from financial analysts but also from investment platforms. Empirical results of the prior studies indicated that the opinions on investment platforms have information content. Investment opinions posted by influential web-based investment experts on Gub may affect stock trading because the viewpoints are commented on, reposted, or clicked the like button. These experts may also play a role in monitoring the analysts and firms' managers. This study examines whether influential web-based investment experts have expressed their opinions on a firm, resulting in analysts with low ability and fewer industry experiences stopping following the firm. This study also investigates whether analysts with high ability or more industry experience have higher incentives to issue long-term forecasts after influential web-based investment experts have expressed their opinions. Moreover, this study examines whether the managers' earnings management behavior changes after influential web-based investment experts have expressed their views on a specific firm. The empirical results demonstrate that when influential web-based investment experts have expressed their opinions on a firm, analysts with low ability or fewer industry experiences are more likely to stop covering it. The empirical results indicate that analysts with high ability are more likely to issue long-term earnings forecasts after influential web-based investment experts express their opinions on the same firm for the first time. In contrast, industry experiences do not significantly affect analysts to issue long-term forecasts. The empirical results also show that after influential web-based investment experts start to follow a company on Gub, there is no significant effect on the magnitude of discretionary accrual earnings management and real earnings management. In the additional tests, the empirical results show that managers manipulate earnings through non-operating income and expenses after influential web-based investment experts start to follow a company on Gub.